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Abstract 
Policy outcomes in all but the simplest policy systems emerge from a complex of ecology of 
games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single policies 
operating in isolation.  This paper updates Long's (1958) ecology of games framework with 
Scharpf's (1997) actor-centered institutionalism to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and 
institutions on the context of the ecology of water management games in the San Francisco Bay.  
Actors participating in multiple institutions are analyzed using exponential random graph models 
for bipartite networks representing different assumptions about policy behavior, including 
geographic constraints.  We find that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by Federal and 
state agencies, and collaborative institutions that span across geographic boundaries.  Network 
configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted 
model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is 
important for solving cooperation problems.
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Policy Coordination in an Ecology of Water Management Games 
This article draws on Long's (1958) ecology of games (EG) framework to analyze the 
coordinating roles of institutions and actors in policy settings where outcomes emerge from 
actors pursuing their self-interests in multiple, interdependent and rule-structured games taking 
place within a geographically-defined policy arena.1   The EG perspective grapples with the 
fundamental and non-ignorable reality that all but the simplest policy arenas feature multiple 
policy institutions operating simultaneously.  The potential lack of coordination among different 
institutions and actors is a recipe for collective-action problems such as the inability to provide 
public goods or overexploitation of common-pool resources, which are ubiquitous in the water 
management setting of this article but also in many other policy issues.   
How policy activities are coordinated in such settings is one of the “big questions” in 
public network management theory (Agranoff and McGuire 2002; Klijn, Kooperman, and 
Termeer 1995), which ultimately has the goal of understanding how to engineer the EG to 
achieve practical effectiveness.  The EG metaphor is one way to describe what Fredrickson 
(1999) called the “disarticulated state” involving multiple government and non-governmental 
actors trying to solve complex and interrelated problems (O’Toole 1997; Vigoda 2002;).  The 
EG framework adds to this discussion by explicitly considering the role of multiple policy 
institutions (what van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan 2003 call policy arenas) linked through joint 
participation by actors, where decisions made in different institutions are interdependent.  
Analyzing the structure of such networks is a necessary first step for understanding how they are 
linked to policy outcomes. 
                                                            
1 We treat the terms policy institution and policy venue as synonyms because they all refer to interactions among 
actors guided by rules (e.g.; consensus versus voting, which actors can participate) about how collective-decisions 
are made.  The process of interaction that occurs in a given institution could also be referred to as a policy or 
planning process, which are the terms normally used in the vernacular of real policy actors.    
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Our analysis blends Long's perspective with Scharpf's (1997) actor-centered 
institutionalism to focus on two types of mechanisms—political actors and policy institutions—
for coordinating governance and policy activities within the ecology of games.  Long is 
pessimistic about the possibility of coordination—"The lack of over-all institutions in the 
territorial system and the weakness of those that exist insure that co-ordination is largely 
ecological rather than a matter of conscious rational contriving." (p.255). However, while Long 
does see a role for "civic leadership" where widely-recognized political leaders participate in 
multiple games, active public administration of policy activities within the EG is a difficult task.   
Scharpf envisions a more important role for public administration by focusing on the 
administrative capacity of specific actors, which is a function of their access to police power, 
expertise/information, and financial resources.  Actors use their political influence to shape 
policy decisions and behaviors in ways that reflect their preferences. The actor hypothesis 
suggests that politically powerful actors coordinate policy activities by participating (and 
possibly creating) in many different types of policy institutions, and becoming "popular" with 
other actors, who want to participate in the same venues as the politically powerful.    
The institutions hypothesis focuses on the "observed reality of political interaction that is 
driven by the interactive strategies of purposive actors operating within institutional settings that 
at the same time enable and constrain these strategies" (Scharpf 1997, p. 36). Institutions consist 
of the formal and informal rules that structure human interaction by defining the set of actions 
that may be chosen and the payoffs for those actions.  The neo-institutional economics literature 
analyzes how institutions affect the overall transaction costs (information seeking, bargaining, 
monitoring, and enforcement) of economic exchange, which is viewed as a problem of 
cooperation (North 1990; Williamson 1988).   
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Solving collective-action problems requires actors to deal with two simultaneous issues:  
finding and implementing mutually beneficial policies (efficiency), and bargaining over the 
distribution of mutual benefits (distribution).  Scharpf (1997) provides the simple idea of the 
"negotiator's dilemma" to describe these two key processes.  However, other authors have noted 
the importance of bargaining over the distribution of mutual benefits in prisoner's dilemma and 
other types of social dilemmas (Bowles 2004; Snidal 1985).   The important point is that 
coordination in an EG involves actors using political resources to capture the greatest share of 
the gains over cooperation.  Political conflict and bargaining over efficiency gains is one source 
of transaction costs in the EG, and effective coordination mechanisms would minimize the 
transaction costs of searching for mutually beneficial solutions, bargaining over distribution, and 
monitoring and enforcing the resulting constellation of decisions and agreements.  However, 
there is no guarantee at any given point in time that a particular EG exhibits the right 
configuration of actors and institutions to minimize transaction costs, especially when the 
underlying problems are dynamic and feature multiple sources of uncertainty.   
 With a few exceptions (Dutton 1995; Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010; Conwell, Curry, 
and Schwirian 2003), the EG framework and its variants have received little empirical testing 
and remained largely in the realm of abstract theory with some descriptive case study support. In 
this paper we set out some basic tenets of an EG theory, but it is not our empirical goal to 
examine all the propositions in this argument. Rather, we use network analysis to focus on the 
structure of relationships among actors and institutions. We represent actors and institutions as 
comprising the nodes of a bipartite or affiliation network.   A bipartite network has two distinct 
types of nodes, with connections between nodes of different types. In our case, a connection 
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represents an actor participating in an institution; connecting an actor to an institution constitutes 
a policy game being played.  
Our most sophisticated analytic approach will use exponential random graph models 
(ERGM) for bipartite network structures (Wang et al. 2009).   We estimate a nested series of 
increasingly sophisticated ERGM models, each representing different assumptions about 
strategic behavior in the EG.  We make inferences by examining both the parameter estimates of 
the models, and the residual structural effects not completely explained by a particular model.   
These hypothesized patterns will be derived from theorized structural processes within 
the EG.  For example, our analysis provides insights into the risk hypothesis recently forwarded 
by Berardo and Scholz (2010). The risk hypothesis argues that actors' preferences for network 
structures depend on the payoffs from the underlying games being played.  When the policy 
ecology consists of mainly coordination games, actors prefer to connect to "popular" institutions 
that increase the efficiency of information seeking.  When the policy ecology consists of risky 
cooperation games with free-riding incentives, actors prefer "closed" network structures with 
redundant information but the ability to conditionally cooperate and sanction other actors on the 
basis of reputation and history of interaction.  The models we use extend this argument to the 
case of bipartite networks.   
Water management in the San Francisco Bay of California provides the empirical 
context.  The SF Bay encompasses numerous environmental collective action problems including 
water quality, water supply, climate change, and biodiversity.  There is also a range of actors 
including Federal, State, and local government agencies, special districts, environmental groups, 
economic interest groups, and researchers.  There are a variety of policy institutions, including 
collaborative partnerships, regulatory processes like Total Maximum Daily Load planning under 
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the Clean Water Act, advisory commissions to government organizations, and associations of 
interest groups.  Of specific interest are the more recent attempts at collaborative institutions in 
this area, including Integrated Regional Water Management, the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, 
and others.  Such collaborative institutions are appearing in nearly every policy subsystem 
domestically and internationally, and thus are receiving serious research attention in terms of 
their ability to encourage cooperation and solve environmental conflicts (Sabatier et al. 2005; 
O'Leary et al. 2006; Koontz and Thomas 2006; Ansell and Gash 2008).    
The next section provides an overview of our adaptation of the EG framework, with a 
focus on the coordination roles of actors and institutions.  Because in this article we are 
principally interested in understanding EG structures, we translate relevant propositions from the 
theory into network-related hypotheses, and describe our research design and data collection 
procedure.  The analysis section begins by describing the observed network structure of the Bay 
Area EG, and moves towards ERGM estimates.  The conclusion summarizes our findings and 
speculates on their meaning for political power, public administration, and policy effectiveness 
in complex adaptive systems analyzed using the EG framework.     
Actors and Institutions in an Ecology of Games 
Our version of the EG framework relies on six interrelated concepts:  policy issues, 
policy actors, policy institutions, policy games, policy subsystems, and time.  Although our 
empirical representation of the EG as a bipartite network does not capture all of these elements, 
this section briefly defines them and describes the coordinating roles of political actors and 
institutions. 
Policy issues involve some type of substantive collective-action problem such as water 
pollution, air pollution, traffic congestion, or loss of biodiversity.  The strategic structure of these 
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collective-action problems are the same as in traditional game theory—payoffs from using 
resources are interdependent, actors often ignore the social costs of their decisions, and 
equilibrium outcomes (if they exist) are often inefficient.  The EG framework adds the 
complication that issues may be interconnected through biophysical, economic or social 
processes, so decisions made in the context of one issue may directly affect payoffs in other 
issues.  Policy outcomes depend on how individuals make decisions regarding the resources 
involved with each issue, for example, the amount of non-point source pollution that flows into 
San Francisco Bay or the integrity of the levee system.   
Policy institutions are "collective-choice" settings where actors collectively make 
decisions about the “operational” rules governing individual issues (Ostrom 1990).  Each 
institution derives its authority from some type of legislative, administrative, or judicial decision 
made at higher levels of the political system.  Policy institutions typically have jurisdiction over 
multiple issues at a given time, and hence conversely policy issues are linked to multiple 
institutions.  For instance, the Bay Area IRWM might address land-use and biodiversity, and 
biodiversity is also affected by habitat conservation planning under the Endangered Species Act.  
These interconnections increase the likelihood of decisions in one institution affecting decisions 
in other institutions.  Real-world policy actors often refer to policy institutions as "planning 
processes" or “policy venues” that shape implementation of specific resource management 
activities. 
Policy actors have some “stake” (hence the policy vernacular term “stakeholder”) in the 
outcomes of collective-choice and the resulting rules governing specific issues.  Policy actors 
could be individual resource users like farmers or fishermen, or political actors like agency 
officials, interest groups, or elected officials.  The nature and magnitude of the stakes may vary 
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across different policy actors—fishermen care about the fish populations and catch limits, 
bureaucrats care about budgets, politicians care about votes, and interest groups care about 
members and funding.  Actors participate in policy institutions with jurisdiction over issues they 
care about, and also form networks with others actors in order to gain key political resources like 
information, credibility, and political influence (Berardo and Scholz 2010).  We assume policy 
actors make boundedly rational decisions in a complex and uncertain environment, with a limited 
cognitive representation (e.g; how many institutions exist, what the payoffs are across different 
institutions, and what are the strategies of other actors) of the EG at any given time that makes it 
difficult optimize on the basis of expected future payoffs as envisioned in classical game theory.   
Policy games are defined by the constellation of actors, collective-choice institutions, and 
issues that are at hand in a particular policy subsystem (Scharpf 1997).   Dutton (1995: 381) 
describes policy games as “arenas of competition and cooperation structured by a set of rules and 
assumptions about how to act in order to achieve a particular set of objectives.”  Actors are 
generally self-interested when playing policy games; they seek to achieve their policy 
preferences through participation in the games.  Policy games are not the same as institutions, 
because the linkages between behaviors and outcomes described by a game is a function of 
institutional rules, the preferences and perceptions of policy actors, and the structure of the 
policy issue (e.g. common-pool resources versus public goods).  In the bipartite network, a 
policy game is an observed affiliation tie from an actor to an institution. 
Policy subsystems are geographically defined territories that encompass multiple issues 
(e.g., flooding, water supply and biodiversity), multiple institutions (e.g., integrated regional 
water management, Total Maximum Daily Load programs, and recovery planning for 
endangered species), and multiple actors (e.g.; local, state, and federal government agencies and 
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interest groups) interacting in multiple games.  Our empirical study asks a population of Bay 
Area policy actors to identify the most important water management institutions in which they 
participate.  These actors participating in these institutions constitute the ecology of games at 
hand in the context of Bay Area water management, and  each game provides different 
opportunities for involved actors to acquire resources and achieve their policy goals.  
The EG that exists in a particular subsystem represents a complex adaptive system that 
changes over time.  Change can be endogenously driven by the actors as they participate in 
different games, try out different strategies, engage in policy learning, and even create and 
destroy institutions.  Change can also be imposed exogenously according to the dynamics of the 
underlying resources, which may change incrementally or with tipping points.  Exogenous 
change may also come from higher level institutions, because the EG that occupies a spatially-
defined subsystem like a watershed is usually nested in higher level institutions at the State and 
Federal levels.  
The key question is whether cooperation evolves and helps solve the environmental 
issues in the EG, and the robustness of any cooperative interactions to incremental or sudden 
exogenous change.  For example, if one is interested in the overall level of biodiversity (a 
common-pool resource) or access to clean drinking water (a public good) in a region, then all of 
these games should be considered.  Long's original EG framework assumes coordination is a rare 
and unintentional by-product of individual actors pursuing a narrow range of goals in a limited 
subset of policy games.  Long does recognize that political leaders, driven by broader public 
opinion as expressed through media, may help coordination by exerting leadership across a range 
of games.  Our framework integrates Scharpf's perspective by arguing that the political power of 
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policy actors or the behavioral constraints of institutional rules can coordinate activities in the 
EG. 
Actors as Coordinators 
  Scharpf characterizes actors by their capabilities, preferences, and perceptions.  
Capabilities are a function of the resources an actor commands that allow it to influence 
outcomes in ways that are consistent with preferences.  Our version of the EG framework pays 
particular attention to political authority, expertise, and financial resources.  Actors with the 
political authority to use the police power of the state have the option to appeal to the legal 
system to use coercion to shape behavior. Expertise and information allows actors to better 
understand the consequences of their different strategies. Financial resources allow actors to 
directly implement policy actions like a wetland restoration, or provide money to other actors.     
 Within the United States, these resources tend to be concentrated in the hands of 
government agencies, particularly at the state and Federal level.  Government agencies are 
delegated political authority by higher level political decisions in the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches.  Government agencies collect data and scientific research to support their 
decision-making, and hire employees with specialized expertise.  Agencies often distribute 
financial resources through grant programs where applicants must engage in certain types of 
behaviors to receive the awards.  All of these resources give government agencies the capacity to 
influence the outcomes of policy games in ways that favor their preferences, or even to create 
new games for addressing unresolved issues.  Of course how government agencies shape policy 





Institutions as Coordinators 
 Institutions consist of formal rules and informal norms that constrain the strategies of 
actors, and define the link between strategies and payoffs.   Different institutional arrangements 
have more or less capacity to solve different types of collective-action problems. Institutional 
economics focuses on how institutions influence the transaction costs of searching for mutually 
beneficial solutions, bargaining, and monitoring and enforcing agreements.  Transaction costs are 
reduced when institutional arrangements have a good fit with the structure of the collective-
action problem.  The capacity of institutions to constrain the behavior of multiple actors over 
time complements the coordination activities of actors.    
The mix of institutional types (species) changes over time, and we are particularly 
interested in the role of collaborative partnerships as a new type of institution that is spreading 
throughout all policy arenas.  Collaborative institutions emphasize specific types of institutional 
rules:  inclusive participation of multiple stakeholders, consensus decision-making, integration of 
scientific information, voluntary implementation, and place-based activities (Lubell 2004).  
Proponents argue collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation in the 
context of complex and diffuse environmental problems like non-point source pollution or 
ecosystem management.  In contrast, more centralized regulatory institutions have lower 
transaction costs for concentrated, point-source pollution and have had considerable success in 
solving these problems (at least in Western Democracies).  
We expect collaborative institutions to play a central role within the EG because they 
continue to expand in number with the promise of a more cooperative solutions to intransigent 
policy conflicts. However, there is still considerable debate as to the effectiveness of 
collaborative institutions and we do not claim that the EG observed in Bay Area is minimizing 
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transaction costs.  Furthermore, we do not currently have any objective criteria by which to 
evaluate the efficiency of any particular configuration of the EG although the number of 
environmental problems that continue to plague the Bay Area suggest that transaction costs 
remain substantial.  Understanding how particular configurations of the EG relate to measures of 
policy effectiveness is a rich topic for future research, as evidenced by the continuing debate 
about what policy network structures are linked to environmental effectiveness and adaptive 
capacity of social-ecological systems (Bodin and Crona 2009). This article takes a necessary first 
step by investigating the types of relational structures that exist in a particular EG.   
In addition, we do not hypothesize that institutions and actors are competing mechanisms 
for coordination in the EG. Rather, we believe they are complementary and focus on which types 
of actors and institutions appear to be most important.  Furthermore, we are interested in how the 
types of network structures that emerge around these important nodes may be related to the types 
of underlying collective-action problems faced by the actors; we turn to this issue in the next 
section.   
Network Representation and Hypotheses 
 The EG can be represented as a bipartite network where each policy actor (mode 1) in the 
San Francisco Bay water management arena plays multiple games through their participation 
(links) in one or more policy institutions (mode 2).  The assumption is that actors are choosing in 
which institutions to participate given the current set of available institutions, although the 
creation and destruction of institutions is possible in the dynamics of the system. The bipartite 
representation is admittedly a simplification that does not capture all of the theoretical building 
blocks identified in the previous section. In particular, in this paper we do not attempt to consider 
a dynamic representation, with changing games across time. However, bipartite networks do 
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capture a level of complexity and interdependence that is not typically considered in analyses of 
individual policy actors, or single institutions in isolation.  An individual-level analysis focusing 
only on attitudes and behaviors necessarily misses out on the systemic elements of the structure 
implicit in the term ecology. Individual-level variables remain important and are incorporated as 
attributes in network analysis, but they do not capture how actors participate jointly or separately 
in multiple policy institutions. 
We closely investigate three network processes that are likely to structure the EG: 
network activity, degree dispersion (which can be linked with network centralization), and 
network closure. The extent to which such processes are associated with particular types of 
actors or institutions provides clues about how coordination emerges within the EG.  These three 
network processes been discussed extensively in the analysis of unipartite (e.g., actor-to-actor) 
networks (Snijders et al. 2006), but less so for bipartite networks.    Translated into the context of 
bipartite networks, Berardo and Scholz's (2010) risk hypothesis suggests that bipartite networks 
with high levels of activity and degree dispersion, which tend to be centralized around a small 
number of nodes, provide for efficient information transmission in coordination games.  Bipartite 
networks with high levels of closure provide more redundant links, which can help solve risky 
cooperation problems by providing opportunities for conditional cooperation.    
Each process can be associated with observable network configurations. Network 
configurations are small patterns of ties within the graph (subgraphs), which are sometimes 
referred to as network motifs (Milo et al, 2002)2.  If a particular configuration is a likely outcome 
of a social process occurring within the network, that configuration will occur at a higher 
frequency in the observed network than in a network where links are generated at “random".  
                                                            
2 We prefer the term configuration as it has a much longer tradition in social network theory and methodology 
(Moreno & Jennings, 1938). 
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The term "random" in this context refers to the expected frequency of network configurations 
under different "null" statistical models of the network representing different assumptions about 
the strategic behavior of policy actors.    
Network Activity 
The number of ties a node has can be interpreted broadly as a measure of network activity 
or popularity3; network analysis typically refers to this as the degree of a node.  We are 
interested in whether the different types of actor and institutions observed in our data have 
greater or lesser network activity. For instance, we hypothesize that Federal and State 
government actors will have more network activity due to greater capacity, and collaborative 
institutions will have more network activity due to institutional rules encouraging broad 
participation.  Figure 1 shows the two relevant configurations associated with network activity in 
a bipartite graph, where a square represents an actor and a circle an institution, and a filled 
(black) shape represents a particular type of institution or actor and an unfilled (white) shape any 
type of actor or institution.    
[Figure 1 about here] 
The top panel of the figure shows a configuration of an actor of a particular type having a 
tie to an institution (of any type).  If that type of actor is more active than others in the network, 
we will see more of these configurations than we expect to see by chance in the data. For 
instance, if the filled square represented Federal government agencies, and if these agencies 
exhibited more network activity than other types of actors, then we would see relatively more of 
these Federal government configurations in the data.   Accordingly, the analysis measures the 
frequency of these configurations for each type of actor and institution.    
                                                            
3 The term “popularity” is best reserved for network ties in which there are directions. In this article with undirected 
bipartite graphs, we simply use the term “activity”. 
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Centralization and Degree Dispersion 
However, network activity may be distributed in different ways. Each node could have a 
relatively similar number of degrees, or some nodes could have very high degrees with many 
nodes with relatively low degrees.  More centralized networks have high levels of activity 
around a small number of central actors and institutions.  This plays out as higher variance for 
the distribution of degrees across the nodes, or in other words higher degree dispersion.   
Central actors or institutions are likely to have the most potential to exercise leadership 
and coordination in the rest of the system.  Given their access to information, financial resources, 
and police power, we expect state and federal government agencies to be the most centralized 
type of actor.  Given their role as new institutions specifically designed to integrate across 
multiple actors and address issues left unresolved by older institutions, we expect collaborative 
partnerships to be the most centralized type of institution.   
 Network centralization and degree dispersion is represented by "two-star" configurations, 
where a node has connections to two other nodes as in Figure 2.  The top panel of that figure 
represents a particular type of actor with connections to two institutions. It is important to 
recognize that the configuration does not represent connections to only two institutions. A node 
with degree d is involved in d(d-1)/2 distinct two-stars; so, for a fixed number of ties, high 
degree nodes are the most efficient way to produce a large number of two-stars. For a given level 
of network activity, then, the presence of more two-stars indicates a more centralized network 
structure based around a smaller number of high degree nodes.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
The conclusion about centralization is conditional on the level of basic network activity. 
For instance, a network with a high level of activity in general will naturally produce high degree 
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nodes even if the activity is equally distributed among them.  On the other hand, a low activity 
network can still be highly centralized if most of that (low) activity is centered on one or two 
nodes.  In a more statistical sense, the activity and dispersion configurations can be seen as 
representing the mean and variance of the degree distribution. The basic activity configuration 
represents the average level of activity, while the two-star or dispersion configuration represents 
the variance of activity around that mean.  
Network Closure and Clustering  
Network closure has been discussed extensively for unipartite social networks and is 
widely observed empirically (e.g. see Snijders et al., 2006). Network closure occurs in unipartite 
networks when a network path from actors i to j to k is closed into a triangle configuration with 
an additional tie between k and i.  The ratio of closed triangles to potential triangles is often 
referred to as the clustering coefficient (Wang et al. 2009).  Discussions of network closure 
extend back to Simmel (1908), and remain a major theme in network theory since the work of 
Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992), both of whom consider how closed versus open network 
structures influence an individual’s access to social resources.   
Unipartite network closure can arise because individuals introduce acquaintances to each 
other, because people with similar interests, concerns or pressures come into the same social 
environment, or because people tend to operate in team-like, collaborative structures.  There are 
various likely outcomes: these closed structures can enhance social support and cooperation, they 
permit closer scrutiny of actions, and they may lead to stronger group norms or localized 
cultures. Closed structures provide the security of redundancy (more ties are used than necessary 
to provide connection between actors), but may inhibit the flow of new information or 
innovation (Scholz and Berardo 2010). Network closure involves a tradeoff between processes 
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that benefit from coherence and reputation, versus the efficiency of information that comes from 
a multiplicity of non-redundant ties. 
Bipartite networks require extending the notion of closure beyond the triadic 
configurations and the simplest configuration is a four-cycle depicted in Figure 3 (Wang et al, 
2009).  In our case, these represent circumstances when actors of the same type are tied to the 
same multiple institutions, and when institutions of the same type attract the same actors. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Analogous to the unipartite arguments above, bipartite closure represents a more cohesive, 
collaborative structure, but possibly with costs in terms of overlap and redundancy.  Given our 
discussion of the coordinating role of institutions and actors, we expect the highest levels of 
closure to be centered on Federal and State government actors, and collaborative institutions that 
have the goal to organize multiple stakeholders. 
Study Design:  The Ecology of Water Management Games in the San Francisco Bay, 
California 
 The SF Bay is one of the most important coastal regions in the West Coast of North 
America, and involves numerous environmental issues, actors, and policy institutions.  The 
environmental issues encompass both public goods such as water supply and flood control, and 
common-pool resources like water quality, biodiversity, and mitigation of climate change.  
Federal and state agencies have consistently played important roles in the governance of these 
issues, with the US Environmental Protection Agency, US Fish and Wildlife Service, CA 
Department of Fish and Game, CA Department of Water Resources, and CA State/Regional 
Water Resources Control Boards as the central actors. But the cast of actors also includes local 
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governments, special districts for water management, special districts for environmental 
management (e.g.; open space), environmental groups, economic interest groups, and scientists. 
 Like in many other watersheds, the policy ecology of the SF Bay is constantly evolving 
and has most recently experienced the emergence of a number of collaborative institutions.  The 
most famous collaborative partnership is CALFED, which emerged from a 1984 agreement 
between California and the USEPA and evolved to encompass both the entire SF Bay-Delta 
watershed.  Especially relevant for this study is the Bay Area Integrated Regional Water 
Management Plan (IRWMP; http://www.bairwmp.org/), which was first initiated in 2005.  The 
2005 California Water Plan embraced IRWMP as one of two strategic initiatives for meeting the 
state’s water management objectives, and California has provided funding for IRWM through 
state bond acts.   The Bay Area IRWMP is one of the most inclusive policy games in the region, 
and also was a primary source for the development of our survey sample. 
Bay Area Survey:  Eliciting the Bipartite Network 
The survey identified actors involved with SF Bay water management by first culling the 
list of participants from the IRWMP public meetings, outreach workshops, and implementation 
projects.   Contact people were identified for each partner organization through web searches or 
by emailing or calling the organizations directly.  A small number of respondents were added to 
the list via nominations from previous stakeholder interviews.  We also cross-checked the list 
with a centralized database of water-related environmental impact reports (EIR) in the region. 
Reflecting the inclusiveness of the IRWMP, most of the organizations were found in both the 
IRWM documents and the EIR database.  The survey was administered in April/May 2008 via a 
mixed-mode method (Dillman 2000), with an introductory letter delivered by first class mail, an 
internet survey to study participants, three email reminders, and then a telephone follow-up with 
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opportunity to answer the survey via telephone.  A total of 167 responses were received (157 via 
Internet, 10 via telephone) for a response rate of 50.8 percent.   
To identify the range of policy institutions in which actors were involved, we used a variant of 
a name-generator network question with the following wording: 
"There are many different forums and processes available for participating in water management 
and planning in the Bay Area.  Planning processes are defined as forums where stakeholders 
make decisions about water management policies, projects, and funding. In the spaces below, 
please list the most important planning/management forums and/or processes that you yourself 
have participated in during the last three years.  Please be as specific as possible with the name 
of the process."4 
 
The survey provided space for respondents to nominate up to three policy institutions, and then 
for each nominated institution, a "hybrid name generator" asked the respondent to write-in their 
collaboration partners in that institution from the categories of Federal agencies, state 
government agencies, local/regional agencies, and private/non-profit actors. In other words, 
respondents not only reported about the activity of their own organization but also about other 
participants in the same institution. Assuming respondents are reliable informants on that part of 
the EG in which their organization participates, we include these other actors and institutions in 
our dataset.  Of the 167 respondents who answered the survey, 70 (41.92%) did not answer these 
questions, 13 (7.78%) nominated one institution, 21 (12.57%) nominated two, and 63 (37.72%) 
nominated three.  Hence, 58% (97/167) of the respondents identified at least one policy 
                                                            
4 We are assuming that each respondent is an informant for the organization.  We did not create a valued link if 
multiple respondents from the same organization indicated participating in the same policy game. For example, there 
were four respondents from Santa Clara Valley Water District who indicated participating in the Bay Area IRWM, 
but Santa Clara Valley Water District only received a score of "1" for linking to IRWM.  This is a conservative 
treatment of the data for organizations that have multiple survey respondents; in particular it avoids the possibility of 
double counting where multiple respondents from the one organization report separately on a single activity.  In 
cases where we have only one survey respondent per organization, we are forced to assume that individual 
represents an entire organization, which means it is possible we miss linkages to policy games that are made by non-
surveyed members of the organization.  This potential undercount of activity is at least somewhat alleviated by the 
hybrid name generator questions, because those questions capture many organizations that were never even sent a 
survey.  But our measured links in the Bay Area ecology of games is likely to be sparse relative to a "valued" 
network that measures connections for every potential respondent from all organizations.   
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institution, and the majority of these identified the requested three institutions.   The hybrid name 
generator mitigates response rate issues because it allows respondents to report on the range of 
actors involved across the ecology without the necessity to survey a respondent from every 
single actor organization.5 Hence, the network data includes 387 total actors including the 
organizations of the primary respondents and actors nominated via the hybrid name generator. 
The data was assembled into a bipartite network where each nominated policy institution 
was associated with the respondent's organization, plus any actors nominated using the hybrid 
name generator.  The actor and institution types (see Figure 7 below) were coded by the 
researchers on the basis of Internet searches.  Two codes that are not straight-forward are "actor 
as venue", which refers to a respondent mentioning a particular agency (e.g.; US Environmental 
Protection Agency) as a venue where important policy decisions are made, and "actor coalition" 
which refers to a coalition of actors that sometimes overlaps with the planning processes elicited 
in the policy institutions question.6 
Using actor websites, we manually coded actors into geospatial regions based mostly on 
county boundaries.   A few actors spanned multiple counties and thus were given sub-regional 
designations like “East Bay” and “South Bay”, which are nomenclatures commonly used 
throughout the region.  The regional coding is used in the ERGM models to designate a 
                                                            
5 This procedure does not limit an organization to have a maximum degree of three connections to any particular 
policy institution.  This is because the hybrid name generator allows multiple mentions of organizations; so an 
organization like the California Department of Water Resources will be nominated as a participant in many different 
institutions.  The hybrid name generator is not as good as “complete” network data that would come from a 100% 
survey response rate of all possible actors in the EG, but it provides data on a  much larger component of the EG 
than if just respondent organizations were considered.   
6 There is some indeterminacy in the definitions and survey elicitation of games and institutions, because in 
principle any organization consists of a set of actors making collective decisions within the constraints of formal and 
informal institutional rules.  The indeterminacy occurs because of the multi-scale nature of actors and institutions—
individual people are embedded in organizations and then organizations are embedded in policy processes.  As much 
as possible, we tried keep separate the organizations that are typically considered policy stakeholders from the 
policy institutions where collective decisions are made.  The small number of "actor as venue" and "actor coalition" 
nodes is where there is some minor overlap.  Further theoretical development and refinement of the research 
instruments is needed to analyze the consequences of actors nested in multiple levels of institutions. Given the small 
numbers here we do not consider this issue is likely to threaten our general results.  
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geographical clustering parameter.  Actors with statewide jurisdiction such as the California 
Department of Water Resources were excluded from geographical clustering because they 
cannot logically cluster at the sub-regional level.  
The policy institution and hybrid name generator reflect some important theoretical 
issues.  The policy institution question was designed to identify what Ostrom (1999) would call 
the "collective choice" level of governance institutions in the Bay Area.   The question wording 
attempted to translate the policy theory jargon of "collective-choice rules" into the policy 
vernacular of "processes", "forums", and "venues".  These basic terms were accompanied by a 
brief description of the type of decision-making and management functions we were looking for.  
In general, we tried to avoid "constitutional" level institutions like the courts, legislature, and 
governor's office and none of the respondents mentioned these institutions.  We also tried to 
avoid the "operational" level of institutions, where specific decisions are being made about how 
to harvest resources and build infrastructure projects.  As discussed in Alston (1996), it is 
important to hold some levels of a nested institutional structure constant to examine the 
dynamics at other levels.   
 By asking for collaboration partners, the hybrid name generator assumes a non-zero-sum 
payoff structure to the interactions where mutual benefits are possible.  It is clear that we have 
not precisely defined the payoffs available within each game or how payoffs are linked among 
games, and there are many different types of payoffs among the class of non-zero sum games, 
plus different actors may have different mental representations of the rules.  Some of interactions 
may constitute non-zero-sum games where coalitions of actors compete for limited resources.  In 
that case, the collaboration networks within institutions reflect coalition building among common 
interests rather building ties across coalitions with different preferences.      
21 
 
The limitations of this research design should be recognized so that future work can 
replicate and improve on the results here.    As with other network studies, defining the 
appropriate boundaries of the network is a difficult problem.   In this case, our entry point into 
the EG was shaped by the fact that the study funding had the goal of evaluating the IRWMP 
process.  Thus the centrality of the Bay Area IRWMP is partially an artifact of the research 
design and this is explicitly considered in the statistical analysis.   However, the survey sampling 
frame and resulting nomination of policy institutions does encompass a very large portion of the 
Bay Area ecology.  Future research needs to continue to improve on ways to draw satisfactory 
boundaries on the policy ecology.  The network question asking people to nominate specific 
policy processes plus participants was also quite burdensome and created some problems with 
item non-response on those questions.    Future data collection should attempt to separate the 
nomination of the policy institutions from the identification of the actors, possibly using the 
Internet as a method for gaining more information about what actors are participating.    
However, these shortcomings do not eliminate the scientific value of this study.  Despite 
not all respondents answering the policy institutions question, we still identified a large number 
of institutions and have likely explored near boundaries of the network.  In addition, this is the 
first study to measure the EG in this manner and apply the tools of modern network analysis.  
The findings here will provide a useful baseline to compare to later studies using improved 
methodologies.  As in other domains of scientific knowledge, the accumulation of research over 
time will provide more agreement on the key causal processes driving the EG.  
Network Visualization 
 Figure 4 displays the a “spring-embedding” visualization of the entire Bay Area ecology 
of games network, and Figure 5 zooms into the most central actors and institutions having a 
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degree of sixteen or greater.   The red circles represent actors, while the blue squares represent 
institutions.  The size of the shapes is scaled to the degree of the node.  The visualizations show 
that the most the most central actors tend to be state and federal agencies, which have the broad 
geographic scope, expertise, information and political authority hypothesized in the earlier 
section.  The only local actor in the most central group (Figure 5) is the East Bay Municipal 
Utility district, which is one of the largest urban water districts in Northern California.  The 
peripheral actors tend to be local governments and other actors with fewer political resources 
than the keystone agencies.  Some of these peripheral actors are attached to only one institution 
(e.g.; degree of one), and they only appear in the diagram because they were mentioned by a 
survey respondent as important participants in that particular institution.  These peripheral actors 
may be more connected to other institutions if we had full responses from every actor, but a 
slight increase in connectivity in peripheral actors is unlikely to have major effect on the basic 
results reported below. 
[Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
The central institutions consist mostly of watershed-scale collaborative groups, either 
covering the entire Bay-Delta or important sub-watersheds.   Given our study design, it is no 
surprise that IRWMP has the highest centrality of all nodes since our sample list started with that 
institution.  Interestingly, some of the widely known collaborative partnerships have a lower 
degree, such as CALFED and Delta Vision.  Although our data is not longitudinal, the survey 
was conducted at an interesting moment in the evolution of Bay Area water management.  
CALFED had been the dominant policy process in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but after 
mounting political criticism was dismantled in 2010 and replaced by a brand new agency called 
the Delta Stewardship Council.  In other words, our survey was conducted when CALFED was 
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dying while the Delta Stewardship Council was being born, which is one reason why CALFED 
and Delta Vision do not appear as central as one might expect.  This anecdote hints at the 
importance of studying the EG over time, in order to witness changing patterns of participation 
as well as the birth, death, and survival of different types of institutions and actors.  
 Another suggestive aspect of these visualizations is the role of geographic scale and 
spatial jurisdiction.   Visual examination suggests that institutions and actors with a narrower 
geographic scope relative to the policy subsystem under examination are likely to be less central 
nodes.  Furthermore, actors appear linked to institutions with similar place names, which 
suggests geographic clustering.  The ERGM analysis specifically includes a parameter to capture 
the effect of geographic clustering.   
Degree Distribution and Centrality 
 Figure 6 displays the fat-tail distributions characterized by a large number of nodes with 
small numbers of ties, but with a small number of nodes with high numbers of ties.  For actors, 
the modal observed number of connections is one, with median degree of one and an average of 
degree of 3.09.  For institutions, the modal degree is 5 with a median degree of 7 and an average 
degree of 10.33 (without the IRWMP institutional node, the average is still 9.66.)  The mean 
degree of institutions is significantly higher than for actors (t-test=11.67; reject null hypothesis of 
difference =0; p<.01), which suggests that the network is more clustered around institutions than 
actors. 
[Figures 6 and 7 about here] 
 Figure 7 provides further evidence with several standard measures of centrality for bi-
partite networks sorted by actor and institution type (Everett and Borgatti 2005): normalized 
degree, normalized betweeness, and normalized eigenvector centrality.  Degree is simply the 
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number of connections, betweeness is the number of connections that flows through a particular 
node, and Eigenvector centrality is higher when an actor is connected to institutions that are 
well-connected themselves (and vice versa).  As expected from the earlier theoretical discussion, 
it appears that Federal and state government agencies are the most central actors, while 
collaborative partnerships are the most central institutions.  The centrality scores of institutions 
are distributed more evenly across institution types than for actors, suggesting that Federal and 
State agencies serve a stronger coordinating role relative to other actors than collaborative 
institutions relative to other types of institutions.  
Exponential Random Graph Models 
 Exponential random graph models (ERGM) are statistical models of networks that 
account for the interdependent nature of network relationships by explicitly positing a set of 
network processes that give rise to an observed network structure (Robins et al. 2007a; Robins et 
al. 2007b).  The observed network structure (in this case, the Bay Area bipartite network) is 
viewed as one possible outcome of these stochastic network processes.  The localized network 
configurations between actors and institutions can (loosely) be understood as the independent 
variables in the model.  The parameters for these independent variables (i.e., just how attractive 
or unattractive is a particular network configuration?) yields a probability distribution of 
networks from which our observed network (the dependent variable) is drawn.  ERGM models 
allow to be drawn from both the estimated model parameters, and analysis of the residuals where 
certain types of network configurations are more frequent in the observed data than predicted by 
a particular model. Because the models explicitly assume dependence among observations of 
network ties, they require simulation methods to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.   
[Table 1 about here] 
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Table 1 describes a series of nested models that we fit to the data, where each model 
represents a different set of assumptions about political behavior in the EG.  The naïve actor 
model suggests that participation decisions are uniformly distributed across actors and 
institutions without regard to the capacity of different actors or the benefits available in any 
institution.  The political capacity model suggests that participation decisions are non-strategic 
and proportional to the capacity of the actors and the rules shaping participation (i.e.; more 
narrow versus more inclusive) in each institution.   The strategic decision model introduces 
parameters that imply actors have preferences over more complex network structures and 
participation decisions are interdependent and strategic.  In this case, actors may decide whether 
they face challenges of efficient information access as opposed to risk, so that the model includes 
generic parameters pertaining to centralization and closure. The strategic geography model 
introduces a parameter for geographic clustering and implies that opportunities for strategic 
interaction are constrained by the spatially explicit nature of environmental collective-action 
problems.   
Each model includes parameters interpreted in terms of how they influence network 
structure.  The density parameter captures the overall number of ties, with a negative parameter 
indicating a rate of tie formation less than a 50% chance of forming any particular tie.  We also 
specify activity parameters specific to each type of actor and institution, which are equivalent to 
dummy variables that capture the rate of tie formation for the listed node type relative to a 
baseline excluded category (local government for actors and collaborative partnerships for 
institutions).   
The structural and geographic parameters include bipartite structural parameters 
representing generic centralization and closure effects proposed by Wang et al (2009).  The 
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alternating k-star parameter represents network centralization by combining all star-like 
configurations with a geometric weighting so that very high stars do not come to dominate the 
statistic (this assists with model convergence).  A strongly positive parameter estimate indicates 
a structure centralized around a few high degree nodes, while a negative value is a decentralized 
structure with the degree distribution spread more evenly across nodes.  The alternating 2-path 
parameter represents closure by combining 4-cycles and higher order 2-path connections 
between nodes so that configurations with many 2-paths between nodes do not come to dominate 
the statistic. A positive parameter suggests tendencies for network closure, whereas a negative 
parameter indicates the presence of network brokerage. By brokerage, we mean that actors can 
be connected through institutions to other actors who play different games.  The strategic 
versions of our models apply the centralization and closure parameters to actors, and the 
centralization parameter to institutions.7   
The spatial centralization parameter is identical to the generic centralization parameter 
(alternating k-star) except that it only applies when actors come from the same geospatial region. 
The geographic centralization parameter controls for spatial clustering of actors: a positive 
parameter suggests that actors within the same region tend to play the same popular games. 
After fitting each model and interpreting parameter estimates, we examine residual 
structural effects. Each model can be conceptualized as a “null hypothesis” that generates a 
distribution of network statistics that can be compared to the observed network.  From a sample 
of graphs from the distribution, we then count the number of ties, two-stars and four-cycles of 
different types (e.g., Federal government agency four-cycles) and compare them to the observed 
counts in the data and draw further inferences. For example, if the count of a particular type of 
four-cycle in the data (for example, those involving Federal agencies) is “extreme” compared to 
                                                            
7 We experimented with a model that included institutional closure but were not able to obtain convergent estimates. 
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the distribution of four-cycles arising from our simulation of graphs under the null model, we can 
infer a particular process of network structure (in this case, closure among Federal agencies) not 
captured by the parameters of the model.  If it is not extreme, then the number of four-cycles is 
explained by the parameters of the model.   
Following standard null hypothesis criteria, an “extreme” value in the residual analysis 
occurs if the observed data has more or less of a particular configuration than 95% of graphs 
from the simulation.  The means and standard deviations for each type of configuration provide 
the basis for calculating a t-statistic for the observed data; a t-statistic is greater than 2 in absolute 
indicates the observed data is extreme in comparison the null distribution.  
Interpreting model parameters in conjunction with residual analysis is necessary when a 
more complex, well-fitting model has difficulties producing converged maximum likelihood 
estimates (Wang et al 2009). A full model would contain over 50 parameters including structural 
effects as proposed by Wang et al (2009), as well as three parameters (activity, dispersion, 
closure) for each of ten types of actors and six institution types, and spatial parameters for 
sixteen types of actors/institutions.  The novelty of our approach is to apply the Pattison et al 
(2000) strategy of a hierarchy of null models to sharpen inference for bipartite networks.  As a 
result we go further than other network studies (Baldassarri and Diani 2007; Bearman et al. 
2004) that simply compare the observed network statistic to the "naive actor" model (a long 
tradition in network analysis; see Katz and Powell 1957), because we attempt to build more 
complexity and different assumptions about policy decisions into each stage of model building. 
Results:  ERGM Model Estimates and Interpretation 
Table 2 presents parameter estimates for each of the four model types, where very high-
degree nodes (hubs) were treated as exogenous and fixed to be consistent with the data. There 
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was one institution with a degree over 80 (IRWM), and eight Federal and state agencies with 
degrees greater than 20.  When these connections are fixed, the resulting variation in the graph 
distributions is due to network activity away from the hubs. This is one way to control for high-
degree nodes that are possible artifacts of data collection procedures, such as developing survey 
sample lists from previously known institutions.  It also concedes that some actor and institutions 
are central “by design”, and focuses inference on network processes in other parts of the system.  
Fixing hubs was also necessary to obtain model convergence for the strategic decision and 
strategic geography models; including hubs as free parameters caused the models to not 
converge.8    
The parameter estimates in Table 2 provide initial insight into the structure of the EG 
network.  The naïve actor model suggests that overall probability of tie formation is less than 
.50, but this simple model is a poor fit to the data.9  The political capacity model takes into 
account the types of actors and institutions involved in the EG, where the activity parameter for 
each type can be viewed as dummy variable that adjusts the overall density parameter to 
represent greater (positive) or lesser (negative) activity relative to a reference type.  We chose 
local government and collaborative partnerships as reference categories because they expressed 
the largest number of ties in total across respective categories (but not necessarily the greatest 
average number of ties per node within category). A positive parameter indicates that nodes 
within the category tend to exhibit more activity than local government or collaborative 
partnership nodes.  
                                                            
8 We were able to obtain converged parameter estimates for the naïve actor and political capacity models without 
fixed high degree nodes.  These models show higher positive parameter estimates for Federal and State agency 
activity, and smaller negative activity parameters for interest group associations and advisory committees.  
9 Results are not presented here in the interests of space, but a residual analysis shows that the naïve model cannot 
identify the different activity levels of different types of actors and institutions, or the general configurations 
associated with centralization, closure and spatial effects.  
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The results for actor types indicate that Federal agencies have the highest levels of 
activity and that industry groups and education/consulting groups have the lowest in comparison 
to local governments.  Although not shown in Table 2, Federal and state agencies have even 
higher activity in the political capacity model without fixed hubs because the activity parameters 
are capturing their high levels of connectivity.   The negative parameters for all institution types 
indicate that the highest level of network activity is observed within the reference category of 
collaborative partnerships.  These results are consistent with the centralization measures reported 
in Figure 7, and also support our hypotheses about the coordinating roles of collaborative 
institutions and government agencies.   
The strategic decisions model introduces more complex parameters that reflect the 
interdependency of decision-making in the EG.  The strategic decisions model shows significant 
effects for centralization around both actors and institutions, even controlling for exogenous hubs 
and the average activity levels of different types of nodes.  There is a negative effect for closure, 
suggesting some brokerage as actors share games in some institutions but not in others. The actor 
activity parameter estimates are broadly consistent with the previous model. 
The strategic geography model suggests overall patterns of activity, centralization, and 
closure are conditional on spatial opportunities. To begin with, the large and positive geographic 
centralization parameter means that actors are clustering around central games within specific 
geographic regions—geography is constraining strategic decisions.  Several of the activity 
parameters become larger and more significant in the strategic geography model:  Federal 
government, state government, water special district, environmental special district, and “other” 
actor.  This suggests that local government activity is more confined within spatial regions and 
the actors with higher activity are more likely to bridge across geographic boundaries.  
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At the same time, the general actor centralization and closure parameters become 
insignificant once we control for geography; the general structural parameters are now germane 
to network connections between geographic regions.  In particular, the sign of actor 
centralization has changed from positive to negative (and the estimate is close to significance), 
which indicates that centralization tends to occur within spatial regions and actor activity that 
bridges across regions is somewhat decentralized.   
The spatial geography model is the overall best fit to the data, and portrays an interesting 
story of spatially constrained, strategic coordination within the EG.  Local government actors in 
particular are participating in institutions within local sub-regions.  State and Federal agency 
actors, along with collaborative partnerships, are more involved in networks that span geographic 
boundaries, which is consistent with their broader jurisdiction and goals of policy coordination. 
Environmental and water special districts play boundary-spanning roles that may reflect some of 
the unique policy dynamics of the Bay Area.  While many water districts are nested within 
counties, one of the most central actors in network is the East Bay Municipal Utility District, 
which has a service area spanning two counties, acquires water from the Sierra Nevada Foothills 
and tributaries of the California Delta, and water delivery systems that span the entire width of 
the state.  One of the most central environmental special districts is the SF Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission, which regulates land development on the shoreline and riparian 
areas, and also conducts Bay-wide land-use planning.  Actors with this type of broad jurisdiction 
achieve their policy goals through participation in multiple venues in many locations, and thus 





Results: Inferences from Residual Analyses. 
Table 3 presents t-statistics for actor and institution centralization and closure based on 
the final strategic geography model, which is the most complex and best fitting ERGM.  We 
simulated 10 million graphs and took as our sample every 10,000th graph, giving a sample size of 
1,000 (see Wang et al, 2009 for more technical details).   For each graph in the sample we count 
the number of various centralization and closure configurations (as in Figures 2 and 3) to create 
distributions of graph statistics. We use the mean and standard deviation from the simulated 
distribution to calculate a t-statistic for the relevant observed graph statistic. Table 3 reports only 
extreme results with t-statistics greater than two.  
In terms of centralization, the geographic centralization model explains most of the type-
specific centralization effects, except that there is greater centralization observed for state 
agencies and water special districts.  The Berardo and Scholz (2010) risk hypothesis would 
suggest that these agencies have particularly important information roles in the EG.  
The results for closure provide additional evidence about the coordinating roles of 
institutions and actors.  In general, observed closure processes are more extreme than for 
centralization.  According to the risk hypothesis, this suggests that actors and institutions are 
involved in solving high-risk cooperation games with strong free-riding incentives.  Closure 
processes are especially pronounced for government agencies (at each of federal, state and local 
levels), water districts, and environmental groups.  For institutions, the strongest results are for 
interest group associations and collaborative partnerships. These results hold even controlling for 
geography and fixing central hubs, and again are consistent with our hypotheses about the 
coordinating roles of government agencies and collaborative institutions.  There is also evidence 
of coalition building by environmental groups and water special districts, which are two of the 
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key stakeholders who bargain over the distribution of policy resources in the water management 
EG.  As discussed in the introduction, the EG requires solving both cooperation and bargaining 
problems, and the more extreme closure effects around water districts is consistent the traditional 
view of water districts as powerful and well-organized interests (Lubell and Lippert 2011).   
Conclusion: Actors, Institutions, and the Effectiveness of Collaboration 
 This paper breaks new ground by combining the EG framework with exponential random 
graph models of bipartite networks to identify the types of institutions and actors that play a 
central role in coordinating policy activities in the face of risky cooperation problems.  
Consistent with our hypotheses, Federal and state government agencies show the highest levels 
of activity, centralization, and closure, reflecting their control of the important public 
administration resources of expertise, information, police authority, and finances.  Water 
districts, environmental special districts, and environmental groups are also coordinating around 
similar policy institutions, reflecting how different interests form coalitions to bargain over water 
management outcomes.   Geography plays a crucial role in constraining this strategic behavior, 
with more local actors clustered around central institutions with their immediate neighbors, while 
actors with a broader geographic scope are involved with more cross-boundary interactions.  
 Collaborative partnerships are by far the most important type of institution in the current 
Bay Area water management system.  They are the most common type of institution, with the 
highest degree of network activity, and the most closure.  This finding reflects the recent 
popularity of collaborative institutions as an alternative to traditional command-and-control 
regulations. 
 Comparing the different network configurations, network closure as captured by 4-cycle 
configurations produces the strongest departures from the final model.  While there are several 
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potential social processes that explain this finding, all of them have some link to the reputation of 
different types of actors and institutions for solving problems.  Berardo and Scholz's (2010) risk 
hypothesis argues that this is evidence that the EG involves many high-risk cooperation 
problems where reputation is necessary to guard against free-riding.  While this hypothesis 
cannot be completely confirmed without directly measuring the underlying payoffs in these 
various policy games, the findings here strengthen the validity of the Berardo and Scholz 
argument.   
The EG framework brings into sharp focus two critical questions not answered by this 
analysis.  First, while this study measures collaborative ties between actors and institutions, it is 
not clear whether the actors are participating in institutions to solve collective-action problems or 
exert political power to achieve policy preferences.   As noted in the introduction, these are not 
necessarily incompatible goals—actors may be seeking to bargain over the shares of gains from 
cooperation.  But some water management issues may be zero-sum games, where actors are 
participating in institutions in order to shift policies in their favor at the expense of other actors.  
Indeed, Scharpf (1997) highlights the importance of analyzing different types of games, and 
future research will need to develop methods to understand the structure of the different games 
occurring within the institutional ecology. 
Second, this analysis does not answer the question of policy effectiveness.  We take a 
necessary first step by analyzing the structure of Bay Area water management policy networks, 
but the idea of network management requires investigating how different structures are related to 
policy and public administration outputs and outcomes over time.  The standard argument is that 
the picture of the EG presented in Figure 4 is a highly fragmented and ineffective system.  
Indeed, we are not arguing that the current set of institutions in this system has minimized 
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transaction costs; many collective action problems still exist.  However, the Bay Area policy 
ecology is a complex adaptive system that may become more effective as collaboration evolves 
across multiple, diverse institutions.  The current level of institutional diversity provides many 
opportunities for collaboration, as well as policy learning and innovation in the face of 
complexity and uncertainty (Ostrom 2009).  Evaluating effectiveness and adaptive capacity of 
this system requires a dynamic analysis, including measuring environmental outcomes.  While 
any policy ecology will also experience periods of conflict, our results suggest collaborative 
institutions and government actors will play a crucial role in securing gains from cooperation 
over time.   However, there is no guarantee that collaboration will continue to spread in any 
particular policy ecology, and understanding what types of institutions and network structures 
are related to effectiveness requires longitudinal research along with comparisons across 
different types of policy arenas.  The EG framework and network science are promising 
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Figure 2: Basic Configurations for Network Centralization 
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Table 1: Hierarchy of Exponential Random Graph Models 
Naive actor model (Bernoulli model): The observed probability of tie is fixed and connections are then 
probabilistically distributed across each graph in the distribution.  This is similar to a fixed activity distribution 
except that now the mean number of connections across all graphs in the distribution will be the same as the data.  
This model is equivalent to an Erdos-Renyi model, or Bernoulli random graph distribution, in unipartite network 
analysis. It is analogous to a one-parameter log-linear or logistic regression model, predicting the presence or 
absence of an agency-institution connection. The single ERGM parameter is called the density parameter. 
Political capacity model (Bernoulli with node attributes):  This is the naïve actor model with the addition of 
parameters that control for the activity of different types of actors and institutions.  This model is analogous to a 
logistic regression model, predicting the presence of absence of an actor-institution connection, with actor and 
institutional type as dummy variables representing difference in average degree relative to a baseline.  
Strategic decisions model (Structural model with attributes): The political capacity model with the addition of 
parameters that control for centralization of both actors and institutions, and for closure attributable to actor type.  
The additional parameters are the agency and institution alternating k-stars and actor alternating k-2paths 
described by Wang et al (2009).  
Strategic geography model (Structural model with attributes and geographic centralization):  The strategic 
decisions model with the addition of a spatial centralization parameter, an alternating geography k-star parameter 




     
Table 2: ERGM Model Parameter Estimates 









Density -3.88 (0.03)* -3.75 (0.07)* -7.01 (0.35)* -5.77(0.36)* 
Centralization  (actors) --- --- 0.61 (0.11)* -0.21(0.11) 
Centralization  (institutions) --- --- 1.36 (0.18)* 0.56(0.18)* 
Closure (actors) --- --- -0.19(0.05)* -0.06(0.04) 
Geographic Centralization  --- --- --- 1.57(0.05)* 
Actor Type Activity Parameters (Local Government is Excluded Category) 
Federal Government --- 0.45 (0.15)* 0.43 (0.16)* 1.82(0.18)* 
State Government --- 0.19 (0.14) 0.16 (0.13) 1.35(0.16)* 
Water Special District --- 0.13 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.42(0.10)* 
Environmental Special District --- 0.29 (0.17) 0.26 (0.17) 0.46(0.19)* 
Environmental Group --- -0.18 (0.10) -0.16 (0.09) -0.01(0.10) 
Industry Group --- -0.59 (0.26)* -0.50 (0.23)* 0.05(0.29) 
Education/Consulting --- -0.40 (0.18)* -0.32 (0.17) -0.06(0.19) 
Actor Coalition --- -0.03 (0.34) -0.03 (0.33) 0.44(0.38) 
Other Activity --- 0.07 (0.48) 0.11 (0.43) 1.33(0.54)* 
Institution Type Activity Parameters(Collaborative Partnership is Excluded Category) 
Interest Group Association Activity --- -0.22 (0.10)* -0.09 (0.09) -0.04(0.06) 
Advisory Committee Activity --- -0.16 (0.12) -0.10 (0.11) -0.03(0.06) 
Regulatory Process Activity --- -0.78 (0.16)* -0.61(0.15)* -0.36(0.12)* 
Actor as Venue Activity --- -0.70 (0.19)* -0.47 (0.16)* -0.26(0.13)* 
Joint Powers Authority Activity --- 0.16 (0.16) 0.15 (0.15) 0.06(0.10) 
Note:  Cell entries are ERGM parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses.  All models are estimated with 
“exogenous hubs”, with fixed degree distributions for nodes with greater than 20 edges.  *Reject null hypothesis of 





Table 3:  Residual Analysis Showing T-Statistics Greater Than Two 
 Centralization Closure 
Actor Types 
Federal Government   4.7 
State Government 2.0 4.2 
Local Government  14.0 
Water Special District 4.8 25.9 
Environmental Special  District   
Environmental Group  6.9 
Industry Group   
Education/Consulting    
Actor Coalition   
Other Activity   
Institution Types 
Interest Group Association Activity  17.5 
Collaborative Partnership  8.9 
Advisory Committee Activity   
Regulatory Process Activity   
Actor as Venue Activity   
Joint Powers Authority Activity   
 
